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Introduction
Since the seminal research by Baumol (1958) and Schelling (1960) , the literature on strategic delegation has been growing signi…cantly and various types of managerial incentives have been put forward. We may roughly group such incentives into three types, depanding on whether, in addition to its own pro…ts, a …rm's objective function includes also output (or revenue), market share or the rival's pro…ts.
Detecting which actual managerial incentives are subministered by owners in modern corporations is an important empirical question. 1 Not less important, however, is the understanding of which type of delegation contract would be selected from a menu of di¤erent types. Jansen et al. (2009) investigate the strategic choice of managerial incentives in a Cournot industry within the aforementioned threefold menu, and show that, at the subgame perfect equilibrium, owners hire managers through contracts based on comparative performance, the latter being Pareto-e¢ cient for …rms as compared to the two alternatives. Moreover, it turns out that when a …rm delegates while the other does not, the resulting equilibrium outcome at the market stage replicates the Cournot-Stackelberg one, with the managerial …rm leading irrespective of the speci…c nature of the incentive scheme.
In this note, we show that this result, common across the three delegation schemes, is generated by three completely di¤erent mechanisms a¤ecting the best reply function of the managerial …rm.
The three market subgames
The model describes a homogeneous good duopoly with inverse demand function p = a Q; where Q = q 1 + q 2 is aggregate output, q i is the individual quantity of …rm i and a is a positive parameter. Both …rms use the same technology described by the cost function C i = cq i ; with c 2 (0; a). For the sake of simplicity, we pose a c = A. Firms are quantity-setting agents and move simultaneously at the market stage.
The baseline models tackling the separation between ownership and control for strategic reasons share a three-stage structure, where information is complete, symmetric and imperfect in every stage, while being perfect between any two adjacent stages. At the …rst stage, owners decide whether to delegate or not; at the second, if they do, they tune the incentives subministered to their own managers; at the third stage, managers or owners play a Cournot game. In every stage, players behave noncooperatively. Contracts are fully observable.
In general, the incentive given to a …rm's manager consists in a combination of her/his …rm's pro…ts and something else. So far, three alternatives have been accounted for: output level (as in Vickers, 1985) or revenues (Fershtman, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; and Sklivas, 1987) , which are indeed equivalent (Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002) . We will refer to this scheme as We now examine the three speci…c objective functions of managers and the bearings of each type of incentive on Cournot competition in the market stage. 3 
Delegation based on output level
In V F JS, the manager of …rm i chooses output to maximise
where i is the weight attached to output, to be speci…ed in the delegation contract at the second stage by …rm i's owner. The e¤ect of this incentive on …rm i's behaviour in the market stage is captured by a parallel shift of the same …rm's linear reaction function in the output space (see Figure 1 ). The optimal unilateral shift reproduces the Cournot-Stackelberg outcome with the managerial …rm as the leader.
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Delegation based on market share
If an incentive based on market share is adopted, as in JR, the manager's maximand becomes M i = i + i q i = (q i + q j ). The resulting …rst order con-
which produces a best reply function q i (q j ) concave in q j : If …rm j hasn't hired a manager (i.e., j = 0), its best reply is the standard linear Cournot reaction function. Notice that, if q j = 0; (1) is satis…ed by q i = A=2; which is the Stackelberg leader's output. The nonlinear component in the r.h.s. of (1) must be concave for all q j > 0 in order for …rm i's best reply to bend back and intersect …rm j's best reply at q i = A=2.
As illustrated in Figure 2 , the two reaction functions actually intersect in correspondence of the Stackelberg equilibrium with the managerial …rm once again playing the leader's role, with i = 2 5 p 2 1 A 2 =49. Here, the reaction function of the managerial …rm is the thick concave curve departing from the horizontal axis at the monopoly output level and intersecting the entrepreneurial …rm's best reply in correspondence of the same output in point S. 
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Delegation based on comparative performance
In M P , the objective function of the manager of …rm i is M i = i + i j .
The FOC taken on q i yields a best reply function
from which it is evident that delegation modi…es the slope. If the rival has no manager, the optimal contract sets i = 1 in such a way that q i (q j ) becomes ‡at at the Stackelberg leader's output, as depicted in Figure 3 . This is the consequence of the fact that here, while the delegation scheme is nonlinear, it generates a best reply which is linear in q j ; where delegation rotates the 6 reaction function of the managerial …rm. Hence, in order to reproduce the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium, the owner must provide the meneger with a dominant strategy at the market subgame. 
The foregoing discussion produces then the following A straightforward implication of this result is that, if one observes the market subgame equilibrium only, without knowing the nature of the man-7 agerial contract, one cannot infer the exact contents of the incentive given by the owner to her/his manager. This is because, from the standpoint of market allocation and performance, the three contracts are indeed observationally equivalent. That is to say, if your rival is not smart enough to copycat your strategy, then literally anything goes, at least within the threefold menu used so far in this literature.
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